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Trickery and deceit; subterfuge; additional cases
Although the great majority of judicial opinions in deciding the effect on the admissibility of a confession of its procurement by subterfuge consider principally the principle of trustworthiness,[FN17] there are some cases in which a confession induced by subterfuge has been evaluated in terms of a possible violation of the constitutional safeguards as contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
According to the cases in point, deception or fraud practiced upon the defendant in obtaining a confession does not constitute a violation of the principles of due process as long as it does not under the facts of the case amount to mental coercion. |
The following cases contain statements in support of this rule.
United States -- United States ex rel. Caminito v Murphy (1955, CA2 NY) 222 F2d 698, cert den 350 US 896, 100 L ed 788, 76 S Ct 155
United States -- United States ex rel. Morrison v La Vallee (1962, DC NY) 206 F Supp 679, affd (CA2) 319 F2d 37
United States -- Application of Graham (1955, DC Cal) 132 F Supp 69
California -- People v Atchley (1959) 53 Cal 2d 160, 346 P2d 764, cert dismd 366 US 207, 6 L ed 2d 233, 81 S Ct 1051
California -- People v Lopez (1963) 60 Cal 2d 223, 32 Cal Rptr 424, 384 P2d 16
California -- People v Stadnick (1962) 207 Cal App 2d 767, 25 Cal Rptr 30, 99 ALR2d 766
New York -- People v Everett (1962) 10 NY2d 500, 225 NYS2d 193, 180 NE2d 556, cert den 370 US 963, 8 L ed 2d 830, 82 S Ct 1593
In United States ex rel. Caminito v Murphy (1955, CA2 NY) 222 F2d 698, cert den 350 US 896, 100 L ed 788, 76 S Ct 155, the court by way of dictum said
that, alone or together, neither the unlawful detention for many hours nor the deceit in confronting the accused with disguised police officers who lied in identifying him would suffice to vitiate the confessions as unconstitutionally obtained.
Rejecting the contention that a written transcript of a tape recording of a conversation of defendants was obtained by such fraud that its use as evidence was inconsistent with due process, the California Supreme Court in People v Atchley (1959) 53 Cal 2d 160, 346 P2d 764, cert dismd 366 US 207, 6 L ed 2d 233, 81 S Ct 1051, said that the deception itself did not render defendants' statements inadmissible as long as the deception was not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement. In the later case of People v Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal 2d 503, 30 Cal Rptr 538, 381 P2d 394, disapproved on other grounds People v Morse (1964) 60 Cal 2d 631, 36 Cal Rptr 201, 388 P2d 33, the court, in answer to the contention that the issue turned not upon the possibility of falsehood but upon principles of due process, added that in the Atchley Case the court, besides its reference to the effect of the deception upon the truth of the confession, also relied upon the absence of mental coercion and on this ground distinguished Leyra v Denno (1954) 347 US 556, 98 L ed 948, 74 S Ct 716, reh den 348 US 851, 99 L ed 671, 75 S Ct 18, infra.
The contention that defendants had been deprived of due process of law was also raised and denied in People v Stadnick (1962) 207 Cal App 2d 767, 25 Cal Rptr 30, 99 ALR2d 766, stated infra 20.
The following case exemplifies the situation in which mental coercion is added to the originally employed deceit in order to obtain a confession, with the result that the use of the confession so obtained was held to violate due process. In People v Leyra (1951) 302 NY 353, 98 NE2d 553, defendant, after intensive police questioning, was induced to confess by a state-employed psychiatrist who was introduced to the suspect as a doctor to give him medical treatment for an acutely painful attack of sinus. This confession was immediately followed by additional confessions given in rapid succession to a police officer, to defendant's business partner, and to state prosecutors, respectively. The doctor did not tell the defendant that he had been called by the district attorney and that the room in which they apparently were alone had been wired to a recording machine in the basement where the police were listening, but spent more than 11//2 hours with the defendant in making deceptive offers of friendship, in telling him that he was not morally responsible, and in reducing the physically exhausted suspect to almost trancelike submission. Holding that the use of the confession violated due process, the court stated that while deception alone or a mere violation of
confidence by a doctor in the sense that he voluntarily disclosed to the police a confidential communication might not render the confession invalid, in the present case the circumstances were such that the trial court should as a matter of law reject the confession, since it was obtained by mental coercion. After defendant's conviction was reversed, a second trial was had in which only the confessions following the first were used, the trial court submitting to the jury the question of their voluntariness. Defendant was again convicted and his conviction was affirmed. Defendant then filed habeas corpus proceedings in a federal court which denied relief, but the United States Supreme Court in Leyra v Denno (1954) 347 US 556, 98 L ed 948, 74 S Ct 716, reh den 348 US 851, 99 L ed 671, 75 S Ct 18, granted relief and held that the coercive character of the first confession controlled the character of the subsequent confessions, all being part of one continuous process.
And see also in this connection United States ex rel. Everett v Murphy (1964, CA2 NY) 329 F2d 68, a habeas corpus proceeding wherein the United States Court of Appeals reversed the state court conviction in People v Everett (1962) 10 NY2d 500, 225 NYS2d 193, 180 NE2d 556, cert den 370 US 963, 8 L ed 2d 830, 82 S Ct 1593, 9[a][a], on the ground that while the subterfuge used in this case, if standing alone, might be ignored, where it was used to make more plausible the promise of assistance in order to induce confession, it
rendered the confession involuntary.
There is one case by the United States Supreme Court which conceivably may foreshadow a possible change of attitude toward confessions induced by subterfuges. The court in Lisenba v California (1941) 314 US 219, 86 L ed 166, 62 S Ct 280, reh den 315 US 826, 86 L ed 1222, 62 S Ct 620, by way of dictum stated: "If, by fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation of perjury, on the part of those representing the State, the trial of an accused person results in his conviction, he has been denied due process of law. The case can stand no better if, by the same devices, a confession is procured, and used in the trial." In support of this statement the Supreme Court referred to the earlier Supreme Court decision of Mooney v Holohan (1935) 294 US 103, 79 L ed 791, 55 S Ct 340, 98 ALR 406, reh den 294 US 732, 79 L ed 1261, 55 S Ct 511, which case, however, deals only with the presentation of testimony known to the prosecuting authorities to be perjured.
In view of the fact that courts from nearly all jurisdictions have expressed their intense dislike of the use of deceit and fraud in obtaining a confession, [FN18] it would not be too surprising if some day in the future the use of subterfuge--particularly in its more flagrant forms--would be considered as such a violation of the principles of fairness as to render confessions obtained in this way vulnerable to constitutional objections. The Supreme Court
has not only left the way open for such a development by frequently stating that no exact formula for determining whether a confession was voluntary can be established,[FN19] but has emphasized with increasing frequency "the expanded concepts of fairness in obtaining confessions,"[FN20] in support of which it has gone to new lengths in applying the due process clause to state procedures concerning determination of the voluntariness of a confession. [FN1]
Cases:
"Trickery" rendering waiver of privilege against self-incrimination invalid, contemplated by decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), involves affirmative acts of fraud or deceit; police have no duty to disclose to an accused all material
facts known to them from other sources prior to interrogation. People v. Smith, 108 Ill. App. 2d 172, 246 N.E.2d 689 (2d Dist. 1969).
Where defendant, who was free on bail after having been indicted for federal narcotics violations, held conversation, in absence of counsel, with codefendant in latter's automobile and, unknown to defendant, federal agent listened to conversation by means of radio transmitter that had been installed in automobile through codefendant's cooperation with government agents, incriminating statements made by defendant during conversation were held not admissible at his trial; basic protection of Sixth Amendment, guaranteeing defendant's right to assistance of counsel, is denied where there is used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in absence of his counsel, and such rule applies to indirect and surreptitious interrogations, which elicit incriminating statements without defendant's knowledge and which are conducted while defendant is free on bail, as well as to interrogations conducted in jailhouse. Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964).
Notwithstanding deputy sheriff pretended friendship for defendant and
deliberately engaged him in conversation in effort to get defendant to incriminate himself, after he had been indicted for burglary and in absence of counsel, admission made by defendant to sheriff was not obtained in violation of defendant's right to counsel as declared by Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964), and was admissible in evidence where there was nothing misleading, underhanded, or any effort to take advantage of defendant or the existence of any fact which was known to officer and not known to defendant prompting him to engage in conversation; where defendant was not in custody but had bond and was free to come and go as he wished; and where defendant knew he was not talking to a friendly officer, and so testified. Anders v. State, 445 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
Admission of tape-recorded confession obtained by police secretly and deceptively did not deprive accused of due process, where unassociated with any right-to-counsel problem or other circumstances which would render statements inadmissible. Lester v. Wilson, 363 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1966).
Evidence that insurance agent who was also defendant's friend feigned sympathy for defendant and deceived defendant about his motives in order to extract confession from defendant, would certainly be material on issue of whether
defendant's confession was voluntary. Atchley v. Wilson, 300 F. Supp. 68 (N.D. Cal. 1968), judgment aff'd, 412 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1969), judgment rev'd on other grounds, 400 U.S. 446, 91 S. Ct. 485, 27 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1971).
In determining whether police officer has made a misleading promise of reward which would render a defendant's confession involuntary, Supreme Court looks at totality of circumstances, which is subdivided into two main components: officer's statement and defendant's vulnerability. Brown v. State, 354 Ark. 30, 117 S.W.3d 598 (2003).
Right to counsel does not protect accused from revealing evidence against himself in ways other than being coerced into confession or incriminating statement, such as deception in getting defendant to tie knot of same type found at murder scene. People v. Arguello, 65 Cal. 2d 768, 56 Cal. Rptr. 274, 423 P.2d 202 (1967).
See Dismukes v. State, 324 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1975), infra 23.
See People v. Torry, 212 Ill. App. 3d 759, 156 Ill. Dec. 847, 571 N.E.2d 827 (1st Dist. 1991), 9[a].
See State v. Cooper, 217 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1974), infra 13.
As a matter of federal constitutional law, any confession obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence, must be considered involuntary and inadmissible. State v. Turner, 859 So. 2d 911 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003), writ denied, 871 So. 2d 347 (La. 2004).
5[a] Use of subterfuge and the principle of trustworthiness--General rule
As stated before, in the great majority of the cases dealing with the
admissibility of confessions induced by subterfuges the question whether the use of such methods constitutes a violation of the constitutional safeguards was not raised.[FN2] Most of the cases discussing the effect of subterfuge on the admissibility in evidence of a confession base their decision on a determination of the trustworthiness of the confession obtained under the particular circumstances. In this respect all the cases support the general rule that confessions obtained through the use of subterfuge are not vitiated merely because of the employment of such methods as long as the methods used are not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement.[FN3]
While occasional dicta may be found which broadly state that confessions obtained by a subterfuge are inadmissible, a closer reading of these statements discloses that they were intended to refer to instances where the subterfuge used was calculated to produce an untrue confession. See, for instance, People v Stevens (1957) 11 Ill 2d 21, 141 NE2d 33, where the court by way of dictum said that "a person must be responsible for admissions and confessions which he has voluntarily made, and only where they have been acquired by trick, promises, or threats, will they be inadmissible."
See also United States v Remolif (1964, DC Nev) 227 F Supp 420, where it was stated that "the confession, admission or other evidence must have been given freely and voluntarily, without oppression, duress or coercion, and that
consent thereto must not have been induced by fraud, trickery or misrepresentation."
The following additional authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this section:
Cases:
Even misrepresentations by law enforcement, while reprehensible, do not necessarily evidence coercive conduct which will render a confession involuntary. U.S. v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1478 (9th Cir. 2003).
Factors to be considered in determining vulnerability of a defendant to police officers' false promises of leniency, as would affect the voluntariness of a defendant's confession, include: (1) age, education, and intelligence of defendant; (2) how long it took to obtain statement; (3) defendant's
experience, if any, with criminal justice system; and (4) delay between Miranda warnings and confession. Brown v. State, 354 Ark. 30, 117 S.W.3d 598 (2003).
Use of trickery to obtain a confession does not render confession inadmissible so long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement; absent any evidence that police investigative techniques were designed to induce the slightest hope of benefit or fear of injury, the resulting statements are not rendered involuntary and inadmissible under statute. O.C.G.A. 24-3-50. DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997).
Confession induced by deception is admissible if method used was not calculated to produce untruthful confession and was not offensive to due process; focus is on whether behavior of State's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear will of accused and bring about confession not freely determined by him. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5; Vernon's Ann. Texas Const. art. I, 10. Flemming v. State, 949 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1997).
5[b] Use of subterfuge and the principle of trustworthiness--Confession held admissible
Based upon the above general rule, in the following cases confessions obtained through the use of subterfuge have been held admissible.
United States -- United States ex rel. Caminito v Murphy (1955, CA2 NY) 222 F2d 698, cert den 350 US 896, 100 L ed 788, 76 S Ct 155 (dictum)
United States -- Young v United States (1939, CA5 Tex) 107 F2d 490
United States -- See Jackson v United States (1900, CA9 Alaska) 102 F 473
United States -- Lewis v United States (1934, CA9 Idaho) 74 F2d 173
United States -- Application of Graham (1955, DC Cal) 132 F Supp 69
Alabama -- King v State (1867) 40 Ala 314
Alabama -- Levison v State (1875) 54 Ala 520
Alabama -- Presley v State (1877) 59 Ala 98
Alabama -- Stone v State (1894) 105 Ala 60, 17 So 114
Alabama -- Burton v State (1894) 107 Ala 108, 18 So 284, ovrld on other grounds
Amos v State (1898) 123 Ala 50, 26 So 524
Alabama -- Curry v State (1919) 203 Ala 239, 82 So 489 (dictum)
Alabama -- Fincher v State (1924) 211 Ala 388, 100 So 657
Alabama -- Burns v State (1932) 226 Ala 117, 145 So 436 (dictum)
California -- People v Castello (1924) 194 Cal 595, 229 P 855, ovrld on other grounds
People v Ditson (1962) 57 Cal 2d 415, 20 Cal Rptr 165, 369 P2d 714, vacated on other grounds 371 US 541, 9 L ed 2d 508, 83 S Ct 519, cert dismd 372 US 933, 9 L ed 2d 769, 83 S Ct 885
California -- People v Connelly (1925) 195 Cal 584, 234 P 374
California -- People v Atchley (1959) 53 Cal 2d 160, 346 P2d 764, cert dismd 366 US 207, 6 L ed 2d 233, 81 S Ct 1051
California -- People v Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal 2d 503, 30 Cal Rptr 538, 381 P2d 394, disapproved on other grounds People v Morse (1964) 60 Cal 2d 631, 36 Cal Rptr 201, 388 P2d 33
California -- People v Madsen (1928) 93 Cal App 711, 270 P 237
California -- People v Thompson (1955) 133 Cal App 2d 4, 284 P2d 39
California -- People v Pendarvis (1961) 189 Cal App 2d 180, 10 Cal Rptr 923
California -- People v Stadnick (1962) 207 Cal App 2d 767, 25 Cal Rptr 30, 99 ALR2d 766
Colorado -- Osborn v People (1927) 83 Colo 4, 262 P 892
Colorado -- Cahill v People (1943) 111 Colo 29, 137 P2d 673, 148 ALR 536
Connecticut -- State v Palko (1936) 121 Conn 669, 186 A 657
Connecticut -- State v Malm (1955) 142 Conn 113, 111 A2d 685
Delaware -- State v Darnell (1870) Houst Crim 321
District of Columbia -- Hardy v United States (1893) 3 App DC 35
Florida -- Denmark v State (1928) 95 Fla 757, 116 So 757
Florida -- Harrison v State (1933) 110 Fla 420, 148 So 882
Georgia -- Marable v State (1892) 89 Ga 425, 15 SE 453
Georgia -- Cornwall v State (1893) 91 Ga 277, 18 SE 154
Georgia -- Sanders v State (1901) 113 Ga 267, 38 SE 841
Georgia -- Hudson v State (1922) 153 Ga 695, 113 SE 519
Illinois -- Gates v People (1853) 14 Ill 433
Illinois -- Shields v People (1907) 132 Ill App 109
Iowa -- State v Fortner (1876) 43 Iowa 494
Iowa -- State v Van Tassel (1897) 103 Iowa 6, 72 NW 497
Iowa -- State v Novak (1899) 109 Iowa 717, 79 NW 465
Iowa -- State v Storms (1901) 113 Iowa 385, 85 NW 610 (dictum)
Iowa -- State v Wescott (1905) 130 Iowa 1, 104 NW 341
Iowa -- State v Hofer (1947) 238 Iowa 820, 28 NW2d 475
Kentucky -- Rutherford v Commonwealth (1859) 59 Ky (2 Met) 387 (dictum)
Kentucky -- Wigginton v Commonwealth (1891) 92 Ky 282, 17 SW 634
Kentucky -- Renaker v Commonwealth (1916) 172 Ky 714, 189 SW 928
Kentucky -- Osborn v Commonwealth (1892) 14 Ky LR 246, 20 SW 223 (by implication)
Louisiana -- State v Allen (1885) 37 La Ann 685
Louisiana -- State v Jones (1911) 127 La 694, 53 So 959
Louisiana -- State v Doyle (1920) 146 La 973, 84 So 315 (dictum)
Maryland -- Markley v State (1938) 173 Md 309, 196 A 95
Maryland -- Ford v State (1943) 181 Md 303, 29 A2d 833
Massachusetts -- Commonwealth v Knapp (1830) 26 Mass (9 Pick) 496
Massachusetts -- Commonwealth v Flood (1890) 152 Mass 529, 25 NE 971
Massachusetts -- Commonwealth v Green (1939) 302 Mass 547, 20 NE2d 417
Michigan -- People v Barker (1886) 60 Mich 277, 27 NW 539
Michigan -- People v Dunnigan (1910) 163 Mich 349, 128 NW 180, 31 LRA NS 940
Michigan -- People v Lipsczinska (1920) 212 Mich 484, 180 NW 617
Michigan -- People v Utter (1921) 217 Mich 74, 185 NW 830
Michigan -- People v Dudgeon (1924) 229 Mich 26, 201 NW 355
Minnesota -- State v Staley (1869) 14 Minn 105, Gil 75
Missouri -- State v Jones (1874) 54 Mo 478
Missouri -- State v Phelps (1881) 74 Mo 128, ovrld on other grounds State v Thompson (1884) 83 Mo 257
Missouri -- State v Hopkirk (1884) 84 Mo 278
Missouri -- State v Fredericks (1884) 85 Mo 145
Missouri -- State v Brooks (1887) 92 Mo 542, 5 SW 257, 330, error dismd 124 US 394, 31 L ed 454, 8 S Ct 443, ovrld on other grounds State v Imboden (1900) 157 Mo 83, 57 SW 536, and ovrld on other grounds State v Hathhorn (1901) 166 Mo 229, 65 SW 756
Missouri -- State v Rush (1888) 95 Mo 199, 8 SW 221
Missouri -- State v Wilson (1903) 172 Mo 420, 72 SW 696
Montana -- State v Rossell (1942) 113 Mont 457, 127 P2d 379
Montana -- State v Robuck (1952) 126 Mont 302, 248 P2d 817
Nebraska -- Heldt v State (1886) 20 Neb 492, 30 NW 626
Nebraska -- McIntosh v State (1920) 105 Neb 328, 180 NW 573, 12 ALR 798
New Hampshire -- State v Squires (1869) 48 NH 364
New York -- People v McMahon (1857) 15 NY 384 (dictum)
New York -- People v Wentz (1867) 37 NY 303 (dictum)
New York -- Cox v People (1880) 80 NY 500
New York -- People v White (1903) 176 NY 331, 68 NE 630
New York -- People v Furlong (1907) 187 NY 198, 79 NE 978
New York -- People v Scott (1909) 195 NY 224, 88 NE 35
New York -- People v Buffom (1915) 214 NY 53, 108 NE 184
New York -- People v Everett (1962) 10 NY2d 500, 225 NYS2d 193, 180 NE2d
556, cert den 370 US 963, 8 L ed 2d 830, 82 S Ct 1593
New York -- People v Stielow (1916, Sup) 161 NYS 599
New York -- Jefferds v People (1862) 5 Park Crim 522
North Carolina -- State v Mitchell (1868) 61 NC (Phill L) 447
North Carolina -- State v Harrison (1894) 115 NC 706, 20 SE 175
Ohio -- Price v State (1868) 18 Ohio St 418
Ohio -- Burchett v State (1930) 35 Ohio App 463, 172 NE 555
Oregon -- See State v Blodgett (1907) 50 Or 329, 92 P 820
Oregon -- State v Howard (1921) 102 Or 431, 203 P 311 (dictum)
Pennsylvania -- Fife v Commonwealth (1857) 29 Pa 429
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Wilson (1898) 186 Pa 1, 40 A 283
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Goodwin (1898) 186 Pa 218, 40 A 412
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Cressinger (1899) 193 Pa 326, 44 A 433
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Spardute (1923) 278 Pa 37, 122 A 161
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Edwards (1935) 318 Pa 1, 178 A 20
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Hipple (1939) 333 Pa 33, 3 A2d 353
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Johnson (1953) 372 Pa 266, 93 A2d 691, cert den 345 US 959, 97 L ed 1379, 73 S Ct 944
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Graham (1962) 408 Pa 155, 182 A2d 727 (dictum)
Pennsylvania -- Commonwealth v Hanlon (1870) 3 Brewst 461
Texas -- Morris v State (1898) 39 Tex Crim 371, 46 SW 253
Texas -- Lawson v State (1899, Tex Crim) 50 SW 345
Texas -- Cortez v State (1902) 43 Tex Crim 375, 66 SW 453
Texas -- Cortez v State (1904) 47 Tex Crim 10, 83 SW 812
Texas -- Spencer v State (1905) 48 Tex Crim 580, 90 SW 638
Virginia -- Omohundro v Commonwealth (1924) 138 Va 854, 121 SE 908
Washington -- State v Thompson (1951) 38 Wash 2d 774, 232 P2d 87
West Virginia -- State v Goldizen (1923) 93 W Va 328, 116 SE 687
Wisconsin -- State v Russell (1892) 83 Wis 330, 53 NW 441
Wisconsin -- Pollack v State (1934) 215 Wis 200, 253 NW 560, 254 NW 471 (dictum)
Wyoming -- Clay v State (1906) 15 Wyo 42, 86 P 17, 544
England -- Rex v Derrington (1826) 2 Car & P 418, 172 Eng Reprint 189
England -- Rex v Mills (1833) 6 Car & P 146, 172 Eng Reprint 1183
England -- Rex v Thomas (1836) 7 Car & P 345, 173 Eng Reprint 154
Canada -- Rex v Todd (1901) 13 Manitoba L 364, 1 BRC 883
Canada -- Rex v Ryan (1905) 9 Ont L 137 (CA)
Canada -- Rex v White (1908) 18 Ont L 640
Confessions obtained through subterfuge admissible if method used is not likely
to procure untrue statement:
US -- Davis v. U.S., 724 A.2d 1163 (D.C. 1998)
Alaska -- Sovalik v. State, 612 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1980) (citing annotation)
Ark -- Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978), cert den 440 US 911, 59 L Ed 2d 460, 99 S Ct 1224
Cal -- People v. Arguello, 65 Cal. 2d 768, 56 Cal. Rptr. 274, 423 P.2d 202 (1967)
Cal -- In re Walker, 10 Cal. 3d 764, 112 Cal. Rptr. 177, 518 P.2d 1129 (1974) (ovrld on other grounds by People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 (1983))
Cal -- People v. Watkins, 6 Cal. App. 3d 119, 85 Cal. Rptr. 621 (3d Dist. 1970)
Cal -- People v. Felix, 72 Cal. App. 3d 879, 139 Cal. Rptr. 366 (2d Dist. 1977) (citing annotation)
Cal -- People v. Lira, 119 Cal. App. 3d 837, 174 Cal. Rptr. 207 (5th Dist. 1981), hearing denied and ordered not to be officially published, (Dec. 9, 1981)
Dist Col -- Matter of D. A. S., 391 A.2d 255 (D.C. 1978)
Ill -- People v. Mann, 30 Ill. App. 3d 508, 333 N.E.2d 467 (3d Dist. 1975)
Mo -- State v. Pugh, 600 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1980) (citing
annotation)
NJ -- State v. Manning, 165 N.J. Super. 19, 397 A.2d 686 (App. Div. 1978), appeal after remand 166 NJ Super 56, 398 A2d 1325, revd on other grounds 82 NJ 417, 413 A2d 605 (citing annotation)
Pa -- Com. v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423, 322 A.2d 119 (1974)
Va -- Jones v. Com., 214 Va. 723, 204 S.E.2d 247 (1974)
The following additional authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this section:
5[c] Use of subterfuge and the principle of trustworthiness--Confession held inadmissible
Based upon the general rule as stated at the beginning of this section, in the following cases confessions obtained through the use of subterfuge have been held inadmissible on the ground that the subterfuge used was calculated to produce an untrue confession.[FN4]
Arkansas -- White v State (1901) 70 Ark 24, 65 SW 937
Michigan -- People v McCullough (1890) 81 Mich 25, 45 NW 515
Mississippi -- Johnson v State (1914) 107 Miss 196, 65 So 218, 51 LRA NS 1183
Missouri -- State v Brockman (1870) 46 Mo 566
Oregon -- State v Green (1929) 128 Or 49, 273 P 381
Texas -- Cook v State (1893) 32 Tex Crim 27, 22 SW 23
Virginia -- Macon v Commonwealth (1948) 187 Va 363, 46 SE2d 396
The following additional authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this section:
Cases:
See State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (Div. 1 1976), supra 3.
6[a] Statements of, and reasons for, rule that subterfuge does not render confession inadmissible--Generally
Nearly all the cases referred to in the preceding sections ( 4 and 5) contain express statements to the effect that a confession is not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that it was obtained by artifice, deception, trickery, or fraud. Some of the cases, although not all of them, specifically refer to the limitation on the admissibility of confessions obtained by the use of a subterfuge, namely, that the method used must not tend to produce an untrue confession. In addition to the preceding two statements, some of these cases also give as a reason for the above rule that the employment of a subterfuge to induce a confession has no tendency to produce an untruthful confession, as distinguished from confessions induced by fear or hope.
The variations in the statements and in the phraseology used are clearly immaterial and no case has been found in which a distinction was made on the basis of the language used in expressing the general principles. Accordingly,
the following statements simply represent the various ways in which the general rule and the reason therefor were formulated by the courts.
The following additional authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this section:
Cases:
Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in custodial ones as well, unless government agents make threats or promises. U.S. v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 04 C.D.O.S. 5393, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7423, 2004 WL 1375521 (9th Cir. 2004).
Misrepresentations linking suspect to crime or statements which inflate extent of evidence against suspect do not necessarily render confession involuntary. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1997).
A confession voluntarily made, but procured by artifice, falsehood, or deception, is admissible. Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1965).
See Edmond v. State, 559 So. 2d 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990), 19[a].
In prosecution for statutory rape, trial court did not err in admitting defendant's statement, where defendant argued that his custodial statement to police should not have been admitted into evidence because he was lied to and deceived into making incriminating statement; confession was admissible though obtained through artifice, trick, or deception, so long as means employed to procure them were not calculated to elicit untrue statement, and that confession was obtained by such means did not preclude finding that confession was freely and voluntarily given. Berry v. State, 210 Ga. App. 789, 437 S.E.2d 630 (1993).
Confessions made under promise of secrecy, or of collateral benefit, are not for that reason excludable. Confessions are admissible though obtained by artifice, trick, or deception. Tyson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 22, 299 S.E.2d
69 (1983).
See State v. Walker, 242 Neb. 99, 493 N.W.2d 329 (1992), 23.
Regardless of materiality, deceptive methods or false statements by police officers are not commendable practices, but standing alone they do not render confession of guilt inadmissible; false statements by officers concerning evidence, as contrasted with threats or promises, are tolerated in confession cases generally, because such statements do not affect reliability of confession. State v. McKinney, 153 N.C. App. 369, 570 S.E.2d 238 (2002).
Deception by the police is not sufficient to make an otherwise valid confession inadmissible unless it appears that the deception produced a coerced or involuntary confession. State v. Owens, 2002 SD 42, 643 N.W.2d 735 (S.D. 2002).
(C) 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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